Charles Couger
President Obama’s December 1st speech, The Way Forward in Afghanistan, was both broad and unoriginal. His three-pronged strategy— “a military effort to create the conditions for a transition [of power]; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action [in the region]; and an effective partnership with Pakistan”— is a simple conglomeration of policies already tested by Truman, Nixon, Reagan, Clinton and Bush.[i] And, although the enemies and global conditions may have changed, the strategies remain the same and the consequences are likely to repeat. An overview of the various foreign policies spanning the last five decades offers tremendous insight into the War in Afghanistan and the likely outcome.
Foreign Policy
Every foreign policy approach can be broken down into four distinct, and mutually dependent, categories: political, ideological, economic and military.
Political differences are defined by regimes—or the differences between governments. Each regime has three characteristics: the politeia, or the authoritative institutions in a regime; the politeuma, or the persons who rule; and the Bios Ti, or the way of life. These attributes significantly influence the next approach to foreign policy, that being philosophy or ideology.
Philosophical differences — religion or ideology — can draw nations together or pull nations apart.
Economics can change the way regimes behave. Besides the ideological issues between economic systems, globalization (or isolation) can significantly effect interactions between nations.
Military strategy is an obvious approach to foreign policy that incorporates global alliances, multilateral attacks, military attacks and arms control.
The War: Who are We Fighting and Why are We There?
To address the four foreign policy points, one must first study the reasons for military action in Afghanistan—a situation that has tremendous historical precedent. President Obama points out that, “On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 people.” This, of course, was not the first example of terrorists killing Americans. As early as 1983, then President Ronald Reagan told Americans, “we have strong circumstantial evidence that the attack on the marines was directed by terrorists who used the same method to destroy our Embassy in Beirut.”[ii] By 1996, Clinton was dealing with terrorists, and after bombings in Saudi Arabia, he noted, “We’re meeting at a time of peace and prosperity but in the shadow of terrorism.”[iii] A shadow that looms large in American foreign policy. It was not, however, until 2001, and the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, that the terrorists had actually killed Americans on American soil. So we went to war.
Regimes, Global Politics and Terrorism
In the context of a political approach to foreign policy, this makes the regime issue particularly unique. Terrorists, after all, are not part of an actual state or an actual regime; they may have a population, but they do not have territory or geographic centralization. Simply put, terrorists must necessarily rely on actual states to provide funding and support. In the case of Al-Qaeda, the most notable supporter was Afghanistan. Obama recognizes this issue, “…unlike the great power conflicts and clear lines of division that defined the 20th century, our effort will involve disorderly regions, failed states, diffuse enemies.” The regime issue is only pertinent in terms of Bios Ti; the Islamic militants are intent on creating a Muslim regime and changing the western way of life, through Khalifah. The terrorists’ motive is simple: after the fall of the Soviet Union, a “new world order” emerged, one dominated by Western regimes and philosophies—a world that is not compatible with the Islamic way of life. In other words, terrorists are part of a well-organized and highly transparent network that is devoted to bringing down the modern state.
Ideological Clash
The conflict, then, is an ideological clash: two civilizations in a fundamental war of philosophy—the Americans and the role they play in the world, and the Islamic rejection of that role. America’s duty to the world, according to Obama, is to “speak out on behalf of [people’s] human rights, and tend to the light of freedom and justice and opportunity and respect for the dignity of all peoples….” Indeed, “That is who we are. That is the source, the moral source, of America’s authority.” This is completely unoriginal. In a letter to General Secretary Brezhnev, Jimmy Carter wrote, “At the same time we can not be indifferent to the fate of freedom and individual human rights.”[iv] The enemies changed, however the philosophical mission remains the same. And, if Osama bin Laden’s cave had an address, President Obama would likely write him a similar letter.
Foreign Aid
This philosophical duty is fulfilled by another category of foreign policy: economics. To aid and abet a friendly democratic regime in Afghanistan, Obama presents an economic initiative in the region. The first objective is to “focus our assistance in areas — such as agriculture — that can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.” Pakistan, a notorious geopolitical chokepoint, will also receive aid, “…to support Pakistan’s democracy and development.” Regime building in the region can be fostered, according to Obama, through economic aid and assistance.
Again, this is a tested approach. President Truman argued in 1951 that “we shall have to extend economic assistance, where it can be effective.”[v] The aid served two purposes: to help “do what we can to help people who are striving to advance from misery, poverty, and hunger,” and to contain communist expansion. The most spectacular example, according to historian Walter LaFeber, was the Marshall Plan. Over the course of a few years, the United States spent over $13 billion on economic development in Western Europe. According to LaFeber, “The Marshall Plan was… perhaps the greatest postwar success of U.S. diplomacy.”[vi] Almost forty years later, in March of 1986, Ronald Reagan announced an economic plan to send “an aid package of $100 million for the more than 20,000 freedom fighters struggling to bring democracy to [Nicaragua].”[vii] This policy was also successful. Economic aid—from Truman to Reagan to Obama to any of the other presidential administrations that have used it—is a peaceful attempt to build regimes compatible with the United States.
Military Action: Multilateralism, “Afghanistanization,” Time-Tabe and Arms Control
Obama, however, realizes that economic aid is not enough to build an anti-terror regime in Afghanistan—he falls back upon the final category of foreign policy: military action. At the same time, he does not believe that America can accomplish the mission alone. After all, “we will work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security.” So, like many 20th Century presidents, Obama is searching for an international approach to American foreign policy. A good example of multilateral engagement is the Korean War. Truman points out in his Address to the Nation on Korea that “52 of the 59 countries which are members of the United Nations have given their support to the action taken by the Security Council to restore peace in Korea.”[viii] Decades later, George H. W. Bush, who was at one point the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, also sought help from the UN. In a speech to the United Nation’s General Assembly, he remained dedicated to internationalism, saying that “we’ve shown that the U.N. can count on the collective strength of the international community.”[ix] The Iraqi regime, under Saddam Hussein, would soon feel the “collective strength of the international community” come crushing down upon him. We have tried multilateralism before, and it has worked.
In another sense, Pakistan is to Afghanistan what Cambodia was to Vietnam. Obama observes, “we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan.” The northern region of Pakistan, harbors terrorists and serves as a safe haven for exiled Taliban leaders. Which is why, according to Obama, “we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border.” Nixon was locked into a similar situation, “North Vietnam has occupied military sanctuaries all along the Cambodian frontier with South Vietnam.”[x] Nixon’s response to the problem was a massive bombing campaign and a military invasion. Obama’s response is economic aid to Pakistan to assist them in their own anti-terror missions.
Another unique parallel between Obama’s plans and history is his effort to “to transfer [military] responsibility to the Afghans.” His method is simple: “train competent Afghan security forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.” Nixon attempted a similar policy in Vietnam. In his famous Silent Majority speech, Nixon discusses “Vietnamization,” or his strategy to “withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.” [xi] According to LaFeber, “The idea had first appeared in the 1950s, when U.S. officials wanted ‘good Asians’ to fight ‘bad Asians.’ It had not worked.”[xii] But the original failure did not stop Nixon, and, unsurprisingly, his attempt also failed—roughly two years after the Paris Peace Accords, North Vietnamese troops marched into South Vietnam, unhindered by the American trained South Vietnamese troops. Although this technique has historically failed, Obama is intent on trying it again.
Another failed technique that President Obama is recycling in Afghanistan is the timetable, or guaranteeing a troop withdrawal. He remarks, “We will remove our combat brigades from Iraq by the end of next summer, and all of our troops by the end of 2011.” Nixon also engaged in premeditated evacuation. Exactly like Obama, Nixon sought to “withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule….”[xiii] This strategy does not make sense. In Vietnam, and in Afghanistan, enemy combatants must simply wait out the timetable—once the western forces leave, they can reengage in combat. This phenomenon is like the lame duck presidency scenario— if Congress is working against a term-limited executive, they must simply wait until the next president is inaugurated to pass legislation. This happens all the time, and in terms of regime changes, it will happen in Afghanistan in 2011, just like it did in Vietnam in 1975.
A final parallel, between Obama’s strategy and history, is his plan for arms control. President Obama has “made it a central pillar of [his] foreign policy to secure loose nuclear materials from terrorists, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and to pursue the goal of a world without them….” There are two fundamental views on arms: first is the Nixon-Carter-Obama view, that arms are a symptom of miscommunication. Their plan is arms limitation through treaties like ABM, SALT I, SALT II, all of which are technical fixes to political problems. Simply put, arms control will simply encourage innovation in other types of weaponry. During Détente, the Soviets finally had the time to match U.S. technology. And that is exactly what happened. The second view, articulated by Ronald Reagan in his Brandenburg Gate speech, holds that “[We] do not mistrust each other because we are armed; we are armed because we mistrust each other.”[xiv] For Reagan, an arms race is a symptom of a regime issue; for Obama and others, the arms race produces the tension. Obama’s plan is going to be particularly unsuccessful, because the failures of 20th Century Arms control will be compounded by the fact that terrorist will not, and can not, sign treaties. In other words, our enemies will continue to develop destructive weapons and the terrorists will get hold of these new weapons. Moreover, American hegemony will decrease, because the only regime that will truly abide by the arms limitation agreements will be the United State.
Obama’s strategy for Afghanistan is tried and tested. Some policies—economic aid and internationalism—have historically worked. Others—like Vietnamization, timetables, and arms control—have failed miserably. But the particular enemy in Afghanistan, which remains a legitimate threat and an illusive target, could dramatically change the outcome of these strategies. For success in Afghanistan, the Obama administration must necessarily study regime differences and the fundamental philosophical battle going on. A lack of cultural and political understanding, mixed with ill thought out strategies, could prove tragic for the American efforts in Afghanistan.
[i] Barack Obama: Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, December 1, 2009
[ii] Ronald Reagan: Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada, Oct. 27, 1983
[iii] Bill Clinton: Presidential Address on Combating Crime and Terrorism, June 29, 1996
[iv] Jimmy Carter: Letter to General Secretary Brezhnev, Jan. 26, 1977
[v] Harry S. Truman: Annual Message to Congress, January 8, 1951
[vi] LaFeber, Walter. American age United States foreign policy at home and abroad since 1750. New York: Norton, 1994. Print. 482.
[vii] Ronald Reagan: Address to the Nation on the Situation in Nicaragua, March 1986
[viii] Harry S. Truman: Address to the Nation on Korea, July 19, 1950
[ix] George Bush: Address Before the 45th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, Oct. 1, 1990
[x] Richard Nixon: Invasion of Cambodia Speech, April 1970
[xi] Richard Nixon: “The Silent Majority” Speech, Nov. 1969
[xii] LaFeber. 638.
[xiii] “The Silent Majority” Speech, Nov. 1969
[xiv] Ronald Reagan: Remarks at the Brandenburg Gate, June 1987
